In this paper we consider the optimal reinsurance problem in endogenous form w.r.t. general convex risk measures and prizing rules π. By means of a subdifferential formula for compositions in Banach spaces we first characterize optimal reinsurance contracts in the case of one insurance taker and one insurer. In the second step we generalize the characterization to the case of several insurance takers. As consequence we obtain a result saying that cooperation provides less risk compared to the individual acting of insurance takers. Our results extend previously known results from the literature.
Introduction
(Re)Insurance problems are classical problems in mathematical economics and insurance. They have been studied in the context of expected utilities in extenso, to name a few papers: Borch (1962) , Arrow (1963) , Raviv (1979) , Deprez and Gerber (1985) , Aase (2006) , Dana and Scarsini (2007) and Kuciński (2011) . Since the upcoming of the risk measure theory in the late 90's there have been several papers which carried over insurance problems to risk measures. Here we refer to Gajek and Zagrodny (2004) , Barrieu and El Karoui (2005b) , Jouini et al. (2007) Balbás et al. (2009) , [KR] (2008) 1 , [KR] (2010), Balbás et al. (2011), and Cheung et al. (2011) .
In the context of risk measures the authors mostly studied insurance problems for specific (classes of) risk measures and prizing rules π and derived explicit solutions of the infimal convolution problem which in the case of one insurer takes the form argmin R { (X − R) + π(R)}.
(1.1)
In this paper we allow general risk-and pricing functionals , π and assume that the premium the insurer charges has a direct endogenous impact on the insurance takers' decision. Thus the problem of consideration has the general form argmin R (X − R + π(R)).
(1.2)
In the expected utility framework this problem was already considered in Deprez and Gerber (1985) . There the authors studied the maximization problem
where u : R −→ R is a risk averse utility function and H is a convex Gâteaux differentiable (pricing) principle.
Let (Ω, F, P) be a probability space and i : L p (P) → [0, ∞] for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be convex, proper, normed, monotone w.r.t. the almost sure order, lower semicontinuous, and subdifferentiable mappings , called in the following risk functionals. The value i (X i ) is called risk of the loss X i ∈ L p and describes the risk evaluation of individual i regarding X i . A natural property of the risk functionals is the monotonicity with respect to the almost sure order, i.e. if X i ≥ Y i almost surely, then i (X i ) ≥ i (Y i ) We focus on unbounded losses and assume that 1 < p < ∞.
In the models we analyze we either have one or n > 1 individuals, in the following called insurance taker(s), who want to insure their initial loss X ∈ L p + with a suitable insurance coverage R ∈ L p such that the residual loss minimizes their risks. The insurance coverages are provided by one insurance company, called insurer, who charges the insurance taker(s) a premium according to a pricing rule π.
Depending on the model we analyze, each individual is endowed with a capital endowment c ∈ R + which represents the maximal amount the insurance taker is willing to spend for the premium of an insurance coverage R. This results in the side constraint π(R) ≤ c. The pricing rules π : L p −→ [0, ∞] are exogenously given normed, non negative, convex, L p -continuous, thus subdifferentiable, functions defined on the space of p-integrable random variables.
For the infimal convolution problem (1.1) a general characterization of solutions is known (see Jouini et al. (2007) , Acciaio (2007) , and [KR] (2008) ). Under certain assumptions optimal coverages R * are characterized by the non emptiness of the intersection
Reformulated this means that there exist V ∈ ∂ (X − R * ) and W ∈ ∂π(R * ) such that 0 = W − V a.s.
In the present paper we show, that the characterization of the solutions to problem (1.2) has a similar shape. In fact R * is an optimal coverage if and only if there exist V ∈ ∂ (X − R * + π(R * )) and W ∈ ∂π(R * ) such that
For translation equivariant risk functionals with the property (X +c) = (X)+ c, c ∈ R we show
Therefore, the characterization in (1.4) reduces in this case to the known condition (1.3) from the infimal convolution problem.
The structure of the paper is the following. At first we adapt and specify a chainrule for subdifferentials of the composition Ψ = • g in general Banach spaces to the optimal insurance problem where g(R) := X − R + π(R). Based on this rule we are able to characterize explicitly optimal insurance coverages in in the framework of subdifferentiable risk functionals.
Then as consequence in Section 2 we analyze the insurance model where one insurance taker insures his initial loss at one insurance company and in Chapter 3 we deal with the case where n insurance takers pool (aggregate) their initial losses and seek to insure it at one insurance company.
Each of these two sections itself is divided into two sections. The first part covers the case where the insurance coverage is chosen arbitrarily and the second part handles the case where only specific insurance coverages are allowed, particularly the side condition, that the premium may not exceed the capital endowment, may not be violated.
In the final section we obtain as consequence a result saying that cooperation between insurance takers provides less risk compared to the individual acting of them. The results of this paper are mainly based on the thesis of Kiesel (2013) .
One Insurance Taker and One Insurer
In this section we deal with the endogenous insurance problem (1.2) in the case of one insurance taker and one insurer. In the first subsection we consider the case of unrestricted insurance parts R.
Unrestricted Contracts
At first we consider the case where one insurance company is willing to cover the initial loss of one insurance taker at any extent, R ∈ L p . Thus the insurance coverage problem can be formulated as follows
(2.1)
We define for a given loss X ∈ L p the mapping g(R) := X − R + π(R). Since the underlying measure P is a probability measure the real numbers R can be regarded as p-integrable constant functions and g :
Obviously the composite function Ψ := • g is proper and convex thus Fermat's Rule applies and gives the following optimality condition.
R 0 is a minimizer of the function h if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Ψ(R 0 ).
(2.2) Therefore, it is crucial to describe the subdifferential of the composition Ψ. Since the mapping g maps into a Banach space we need some basic notions of convex analysis in Banach lattices. Some of these notions as subdifferentials of Banach lattice valued mappings and the necessary definitions and statements including a general chain rule for subdifferentials are collected in Appendix A.
As noted in Appendix A the L p -spaces, 1 < p < ∞ are conditionally complete Banach lattices with σ-order continuous norm. Thus Theorem A.7 is applicable to the composition function Ψ and it holds
where A * [µ] is the notation for the application of the adjoint operator A * of the operator A on µ.
Lemma 2.1 The subdifferential of g at R 0 is given by
Proof: Consider the right directional derivative of g in R 0 . It is given by
We thus get with Proposition A.4
Hence it holds A ∈ ∂g(R 0 ) if and only if A + id L p ∈ ∂π(R 0 ). 2
Next we determine the adjoint operator A * of A ∈ ∂g(R 0 ).
which proves the claim. 2
As consequence we obtain the following description of the subdifferential of the composition Ψ.
Theorem 2.3 The composition function Ψ := • g with g(R) := X − R + π(R) is subdifferentiable and the subdifferential is given by
This theorem enables us to extend the known characterizations of optimal insurance coverages. As consequence of Theorem 2.3 and Fermat's rule we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary 2.4 R 0 ∈ L p is an optimal insurance coverage of problem (2.1) if and only if there exist Z ∈ ∂ (g(R 0 )) and Y ∈ ∂π(R 0 ) such that
Remarks 2.5 a) A sufficient condition for the validity of condition (2.6) is the following. If there exists an insurance coverage R 0 , such that
then (2.6) holds for every Y ∈ ∂π(R 0 ). Hence this R 0 is an optimal insurance coverage of (2.1).
For lower semicontinuous convex risk functionals (2.7) is equivalent to the condition
Under this condition the solutions of the optimization problem
describe optimal insurance coverages which additionally minimize the premium.
If there does not exist an element R 0 ∈ L p such that condition (2.7) holds, then we get at least a necessary condition for Y ∈ ∂π(R). Taking the expectation in (2.6) we see that for any optimal insurance coverage R 0 it has to hold:
] and π(X) := H(X), where u : R −→ R is a risk averse utility function and H is a convex Gâteaux differentiable prizing principle Corollary 2.4 yields the characterization of optimal insurance contracts R 0 by
which corresponds to Deprez and Gerber (1985, Theorem 9) .
We next consider condition (2.6) for the special class of cash invariant risk functionals as in classical monetary risk measure theory.
be a lower semicontinuous, convex, and cash invariant function with f (0) < ∞. Then for any X ∈ L p the following implication holds
Proof: From the definition of the convex conjugate and the properties of f we derive
the proof is complete. 2
With this result Corollary 2.4 reads as follows for cash invariant risk functionals.
Corollary 2.7 If the underlying risk functional is additionally cash invariant, then R 0 is an optimal insurance coverage of (2.1) if and only if there exist
As mentioned in the introduction the statement of the previous corollary corresponds to the characterization of an optimal allocation of the minimal total risk problem with respect to and π in (1.3).
Restricted Contracts
Classical insurance contracts only cover parts of the risk and do not allow overinsurance R > X or negative risk increasing parts R < 0. The coverage R taken by the insurer is determined by a mapping I of the initial loss X ∈ L p + . The coverage R of the initial loss covered by the insurer is described by R = I(X) and I is called insurance contract.
The set of all admissible insurance contracts is given by
(2.12)
For a loss X ∈ L p + the set of its admissible coverages thus is given by
With the cost constraint π(R) ≤ c, where c > 0 represents the maximal amount of money the insurance taker is willing to pay for an insurance, the minimization problem of interest is argmin R∈R, π(R)≤c
(2.14)
In the classical papers as in Deprez and Gerber (1985) this problem is considered for the linear prizing rule
In several of the papers mentioned in the introduction it is shown that for law invariant risk measures stop-loss reinsurances and related contracts are optimal.
In order to apply the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (see Theorem B.1) to characterize solutions of the optimal insurance problem (2.14) we next state closedness of the class R of insurance claims Proposition 2.8 R is a convex, closed and bounded subset of L p .
Proof: The convexity and the boundedness of R are obvious. For the proof of the closedness let (R k ) k∈N be a sequence in R which converges in L p to an element R ∈ L p . For each R k ∈ R let I k ∈ I be an insurance contract with I k (X) = R k . By the modified Komlos Lemma as in Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) there exists a sequence I k ∈ conv(I j : j ≥ k), k ∈ N such that I k −→ I a.s. We show that I ∈ I and that I(X) = R. Let (β k j ) j≥0 be the corresponding weights with
As I is convex, we have I k ∈ I for all k ∈ N. We get from the Komlos Lemma the non-negativity of I. Further, since I ∈ I it follows that
Thus we have I ∈ I. It remains to show that I(X) = lim k−→∞ R k = R ∈ R. This follows from
Hence there exists an insurance contract I ∈ I with I(X) = R and thus R ∈ R. 2
The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem provides a characterization for the solutions of restricted minimization problems with functional side conditions. Defining f 1 (R) := π(R) − c, we see that for 0 ∈ R we have f 1 (0) = −c < 0. Thus the Slater condition (B.15) is fulfilled and we conclude with Theorem B.1 that R 0 is a minimizer of (2.14) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier
Here 1 A (x) denotes as usual the convex indicator function (see Appendix B).
If this problem is well-posed, i.e. if 16) where domc(f ) stands for the domain of continuity of the function f domc(f ) := {x | f is finite and continuous at x}, then the subdifferential sum formula (cf. Barbu and Precupanu (1986, Section 3 , Theorem 2.6)) is applicable to (2.15) and yields
Due to Theorem 2.3 we obtain the following Kuhn-Tucker type characterization of optimal insurance coverages.
Theorem 2.9 (Kuhn-Tucker characterization of optimal insuarances) If problem (2.14) is well posed, then R 0 is an optimal insurance coverage of the insurance problem in (2.14) if and only if there exist
(2.18)
In order to get a better understanding of preceding statement we describe the subdifferential ∂1 R .
Lemma 2.10 for an element W ∈ L q holds: W ∈ ∂1 R (R 0 ) if and only if
(2.19)
the sufficiency of these conditions is clear. For the converse we have to discuss every condition separately.
By the same arguments the following listed insurance coverages produce contradictions to the respective sets:
d) On the set D it is not possible to specify the form of a subgradient W . If X = 0 on a certain set U , then every insurance coverage R ∈ R has to be zero itself on U .
Remark: The undeterminedness on the set D can be overcome by considering only risks X ∈ L p + with P(X > 0) = 1, which yields P(D) = 0. 2 Based on Lemma 2.10 we next describe the optimality condition of Theorem 2.9 in more precise form.
Theorem 2.11 Let P(X > 0) = 1. If (2.14) is well posed, then R 0 is an optimal insurance coverage of (2.14) if and only if there exist Z ∈ ∂ (g(R 0 )), Y ∈ ∂π(R 0 ), W ∈ ∂1 R (R 0 ) and a Lagrange multiplier λ 1 ≥ 0 such that
(2.23)
In order to establish the existence of solutions of (2.14) we next state lower semicontinuity of • g.
Lemma 2.12 For lower semicontinuous and a pricing rule π the composite function • g is lower semicontinuous on R.
Proof: Let (R n ) n∈N ⊂ R be a sequence that converges in L p to an element R ∈ R. Then we get from the lower semicontinuity of and the L p -continuity of π lim inf
2 We define the admissible contract set F := {R ∈ L p + | π(R) ≤ c}. From the continuity and the convexity of π we get that F is closed and convex. We reformulate problem (2.14) to
(2.24)
Lemma 2.13 R ∩ F is a closed, bounded and convex subset of L p + .
Proof: Due to Proposition 2.8 and the previous considerations these properties are immediate. 2 Classical results in functional analysis state that in reflexive Banach spaces bounded sets are relatively weakly compact. Moreover, the closure of a convex set coincides with its weak closure. Thus convex, closed, and bounded sets in L p (1 < p < ∞) are weakly compact. On the other hand proper functions defined on a linear normed space are lower semicontinuous if and only if they are weakly lower semicontinuous (cf. Barbu and Precupanu (1986 , Chapter 2, Proposition 1.5)).
Thus Lemma 2.13 and the classical Weierstrass Theorem yield existence of solutions of (2.14).
Theorem 2.14 Let 1 < p < ∞. For a lower semicontinuous convex risk functional : 
Several Insurance Takers and One Insurer
In this chapter we assume that there are n insurance takers with initial losses X i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and risk functionals i respectively, and one insurance company with one pricing rule π. We are now interested in optimal insurance coverages occurring by cooperation. The individuals cooperate by forming a coalition and hence pool their initial losses X i to the total lossX = n i=1 X i . Then they buy an insurance contract from the insurance company and redistribute the residual loss back. In this way we understand the coalition itself as one individual, which intends to insure one initial lossX. The appropriate mutual risk functional this new individual uses has to reflect the procedure of redistributing the residual losses back to the individuals. This, however, depends on the individual risk functionals and suggests to use the infimal convolution (S) := inf
as a joint risk functional. In the following we assume exactness of the infimal convolution , i.e. for any S ∈ L p there exist (S 1 , . . . , S n ) with
. This implies its subdifferentiability as well as its lower semicontinuity (see [KR] (2010)). Interior point conditions are known (see [KR] (2010)) which are sufficient for the validity of the epigraph condition. This epigraph condition in turn is equivalent to the exactness of .
Unrestricted Contracts
We define the unrestricted coalitionary insurance problem by: 
As consequence of Corollary 3.2 we obtain back the known characterizations of coalitional solutions for cash invariant risk functionals and Gâteaux differentiable price functionals π.
Remarks 3.3 a) If there exist k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that k is cash invariant, then R 0 solves (3.2) if and only if
(3.4) b) If additionally to a) the pricing rule π is Gâteaux differentiable, then R 0 solves (3.2) if and only if ∇π(R 0 ) ∈ ∂ (ḡ(R 0 )).
is a coalitional solution of (3.2) if and only if
(3.5)
For lower semicontinuous risk functionals i the latter is equivalent to
Restricted Contracts
As in Section 2.2 we restrict the minimization problem (3.2) to the admissible insurance coverages
Using similar arguments as for Theorem 2.14 we obtain a corresponding existence result for the restricted coalitional insurance problem. WithX = n i=1 X i andc = n i=1 c i we obtain Corollary 3.4 For lower semicontinuous convex risk functionals i : L p −→ R + , 1 < p < ∞ such that is exact, a pricing rule π : L p −→ R + and initial losses X i ∈ L p , there exists an optimal insurance coverage of the problem
Proof: Due to the exactness of and its lower semicontinuity, this follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.14. 2 Further by the arguments in Subsection 2.2 we obtain.
Corollary 3.5 Let P(X > 0) = 1. If (3.8) is well posed, then R 0 is an optimal insurance coverage of (2.14) if and only if there exist Z ∈ ∂ (g(R 0 )), Y ∈ ∂π(R 0 ) and a Lagrange multiplier λ 1 ≥ 0 such that
Combined with Corollary 3.2 we get the following Kuhn-Tucker type characterization of restricted coalitional solutions.
Corollary 3.6 (Kuhn-Tucker characterization of coalitional solutions)
If in the situation of Corollary 3.5 additionally is exact and well posed, then the tuple
coalitional solution of the restricted problem (3.8) if and only if there exist
and a Lagrange multiplier λ 1 ≥ 0 such that the inequalities in Corollary 3.5 hold.
Whether to act Individually or Cooperatively
In the context of a group of n insurance takers and one insurance company the natural question arises whether individual or cooperative insurance contracts provide the lower minimal total risk in the restricted models. We will see in the following that the cooperation provides the lower risk and therefore is preferable.
The total minimization problem where every individual acts on is given by argmin
The objective function is the sum of the individual insurance problems in (2.14). Aiming at comparing (4.1) with the coalitional insurance problem in (3.8) we introduce the following notation. This notation aims to include the side conditions of the corresponding minimization problems into the minimization sets.
For each individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the set of extended insurance contracts for the individual insurance problem is defined by
The set of extended contracts for the insurance coverages is given by
Additionally we denote the corresponding sets of the residual losses after insurance by
The sets of extended coalitional contracts and losses corresponding to the cooperative insurance problem are defined by
denotes the set of all admissible redistributions of the cooperative insurance prob-
Proposition 4.1 The value of the individual insurance problem (4.1) is identical to
The value of the coalitional insurance problem (3.8) is identical to
Proof: We only show the second equality. The first one follows similarly. For the value of problem (3.8) we have
For subadditive pricing rules we have the following relation between individual and cooperative residual losses.
Proposition 4.2 Let π be a subadditive pricing rule. Then for every
From the subadditivity of π we conclude
2 Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3 The value of the individual insurance problem dominates the value of the coalitional insurance problem, i.e.
Proof: The infimal convolution inherits the monotonicity with respect to the almost sure order from the risk functionals i (cf. Acciaio (2007)
Since this holds for all (
and the claim follows from Proposition 4.1. 2
A Subdifferentiability of Banach Lattice Valued Mappings
In this section we collect some notions and results on subdifferentiability of Banach lattice valued mappings as used in Sections 2-4 of this paper. Let (Y, ≤) be a Banach lattice. We assume throughout, that Y is conditionally (or Dedekind) complete, i.e. every subset A ⊂ Y which is bounded above has a least upper bound y 0 = sup A. In particular reflexive Banach lattices as L p , 1 < p < ∞, are conditionally complete.
Let F : X −→ Y be a convex mapping from the Banach space X to Y and denote the directional derivative in x 0 in direction x by
Proof: For h > 0 the difference quotient
Moreover it is monotonic increasing in h. Therefore let h 1 < h 2 , then the convexity of F gives:
This is equivalent to
Thus g(x 0 , x, h) decreases monotonically for h 0 and it holds
which implies that for all h > 0
Thus g(x 0 , x, h), h > 0 are bounded from below by −g(x 0 , x, −1) and conditional completeness of Y implies the existence of the element D(F,
The subdifferential of a Banach lattice valued mapping is defined analogously to the real case.
Definition A.2 The subdifferential of the convex mapping F : X −→ Y at x 0 ∈ X is defined by
Here L(X, Y ) stands for the set of all linear continuous operators on X with values in Y .
We next collect some useful results stated in Ioffe and Levin (1972) concerning the right directional derivative and the subdifferential. In lattices the concept of order convergence can be introduced in a natural way. Therefore, when speaking of an increasing sequence (y n ) n∈N we understand that y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ . . . ≤ y n ≤ . . .. −→ y 0 or y 0 = (o) − lim n−→∞ y n ) if there exist two monotonic sequences in Y -one decreasing (x n ) and one increasing (z n ) -such that The following theorem is a subdifferential chain rule for the composition of a real valued function and a Banach lattice valued mapping.
Theorem A.7 (Chain rule for subdifferentials) Let F : G −→ U be a continuous convex mapping, G ⊂ X and U ⊂ Y be open convex sets, where X is a Banach space and Y is a conditionally complete Banach lattice with property (A) and let be a monotonic convex real valued function on U . Then for the composition Ψ := • F and an x 0 ∈ G holds:
where A * denotes the adjoint operator of A.
To study the subdifferential sum formula for Banach lattice valued mappings we rely on the following results in Kusraev and Kutateladze (1995) . These authors introduce a concept called "general position" which guarantees the subdifferential sum formula, similarly to the interior point conditions in the real case (see [KR] (2010)).
Let X and Y be two topological vector spaces and Φ be a subset of the product X × Y . Then Φ is called a correspondence from X to Y . We define the domain dom(Φ) and the image im(Φ) of a correspondence by dom(Φ) : = {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ Φ} im(Φ) : = {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ Φ} For U ⊂ X the correspondence Φ ∩ (U × Y ) is called the restriction of Φ onto U and is denoted by Φ U . The set Φ(U ) := im(Φ U ) is called the image of U under the correspondence Φ and it holds
3. open at a point (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ Φ, if for every neighborhood U of the point x 0 the set Φ(U ) − y 0 is a neighborhood of the origin in Y . For x 0 = 0 and y 0 = 0 we speak about openness at the origin.
Definition A.9 (Non oblate pair) Consider two cones K 1 and K 2 in the topological space X and put κ := (K 1 , K 2 ). We say the pair κ constitutes a non oblate pair, if the conic correspondence Φ κ ⊂ X 2 × X defined by
is open at the origin.
Thus openness of the correspondence Φ κ in the definition above (resp. the non oblateness of the cones K 1 and K 2 ), means that for every neighborhood V ⊂ X of the origin in X the set
is a neighborhood of the origin in X.
The following is a useful characterization of the non oblateness. Let ∆ n : x → (x, . . . , x) denote the embedding of X into the diagonal ∆ n (X) of the space X n .
The latter equivalence becomes in case
Thus x is a (global) minimizer of f if and only if Fermat's rule
is valid. If f is furthermore lower semicontinuous, then we get by the FenchelMoreau theorem the equivalence
Thus in this case ∂f * (0) represents the set of all minimizers of f .
Fermat's rule for restricted minimization problems This is the normal cone N A (x) to the set A at a point x ∈ A and it consists of all vectors which are perpendicular to half-spaces that support A at x. It is a closed convex cone with the origin as vertex and we get the following two properties
• dom(∂1 A ) = A,
• ∂1 A (x) = {0}, for x ∈ int A.
Fermat's rule under a functional side condition
Here we consider a functional form of the preceding restricted minimization problem. Let again E be a Banach space paired with its dual space E * by (E, E * , · | · ). Let the functions f i : E −→ R, i ∈ {0, . . . , n} be convex and the set A ⊂ E be a closed convex subset. Then we consider the minimization problem inf{f 0 (x) | x ∈ A, f i (x) ≤ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} (B.13)
These problems can be solved using the Lagrangian function L(x, λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) := n i=0 λ i f i (x) + 1 A (x) (B.14)
Then the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, stated in the version of Ioffe and Tikhomirov (1979, Chapter 1.1.2) , provides a necessary conditions for x ∈ A to be a solution to problem (B.13). If the Slater condition ∃ x ∈ A such that f i (x) < 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (B.15)
is fulfilled the previous mentioned necessary conditions are sufficient as well.
Theorem B.1 (Kuhn-Tucker Theorem) Let the functions f i : E −→ R, i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and the set A ⊂ E be convex. If there is a y ∈ A which solves problem (B.13), then there exist Lagrangian multipliers (λ 0 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ R n+1 \ {0} such that If the Slater condition (B.15) holds true, then we have λ 0 = 0 and we set λ 0 = 1. In the latter case conditions (B.16) and (B.17) are sufficient for y to minimize (B.13).
Again we assume that the minimization problem is well posed. In this context this means hold.
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